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Abstract
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) provides reserves to market partici-
pants via ﬁxed rate tender auctions. We analyze the banks’ bidding
behavior and identify the determinants for the decision to participate
as well as on the amount to tender. Therefore, we estimate bidding
functions for banks which participate regularly in the SNB’s auctions.
We ﬁnd that a bank’s bids from the previous day and the amount of
maturing repo operations with the SNB have for most banks a signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect. The autonomous factors (government balances at the SNB
and currency in circulation) are of only minor importance. A further
determinant of the bidding behavior is the attractiveness of the SNB’s
auction rate compared to the prevailing interbank market repo rate.
The spread of unsecured and repo rates as well as the attractiveness
of funding Euros indirectly via a Swiss franc repo transaction with the
SNB are only for few banks signiﬁcant. Further, the question is ad-
dressed whether the bidding behavior changed in the ﬁnancial market
crisis of 2007/2008. There is little evidence of a systematic change
in bidding behavior in the crisis. This results from the fact that the
SNB has addressed the volatile demand for reserves in the crisis with
overnight ﬁne-tuning operations.
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1 Introduction
As Switzerland’s central bank the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is mandated
by the constitution to conduct Switzerland’s monetary policy. The SNB’s
monetary policy framework consists of three elements. The ﬁrst element is
a deﬁnition of price stability: The SNB deﬁnes price stability as a rise in
the national consumer price index (CPI) of less than 2% p.a. The second
element is an inﬂation forecast. Since the transmission of monetary policy
to the economy exhibits lags, the inﬂation forecast covers three years. The
third element is a target range for the Swiss franc 3-month Libor, serving
as operational target. To manage the 3-month Libor, the SNB transacts
with ﬁnancial market participants. For a detailed description of the SNB’s
monetary policy framework see SNB (1999).
The SNB’s main instrument to manage the 3-month Libor are daily
repo transactions. Through repo operations the SNB provides reserves to
the banking system (sight deposits at the SNB). To guarantee an equal
treatment of all counterparties, the SNB conducts its daily 1-week repo
transactions in the form of an auction. It thereby uses a ﬁxed rate tender.
The SNB announces the conditions of the repo transaction (repo rate and
term). The counterparties submit their bids. Each counterparty submits the
amount for which it is willing to accept reserves at the given repo rate. If the
total amount of all bids exceeds the SNB’s planned allotment, it allocates the
reserves proportionally to the counterparty’s bid (see SNB (2008)). Since
banks usually anticipate the proportional cut of their bid, they incorporate
this expectation when assessing the amount to tender.
The aim of this paper is to shed light on banks’ decision to participate
in the 1-week repo auction and on the determinants of the bid amount.
Based on individual bidding data from 29 banks that participated regularly
in the SNB’s auctions we estimate two bid functions per bank. The ﬁrst
bid function models a bank’s decision to take part in the auction and the
second estimates the bank’s bid amount. These functions help to better
understand demand in the SNB’s liquidity providing operations. This is of
special interest as the SNB grants access to a wide range of counterparties,
comprising banks domiciled in Switzerland but also banks domiciled abroad.
The sample ranges from January 2004 to September 2008. Hence, it
covers the ﬁrst part of the money market turmoil that started in August
2007. The period since October 2008 is not included, since the SNB has
employed a wider range of instruments in that time. Other central banks
provided Swiss francs to their counterparties too. We cannot observe if
banks participating in the SNB’s auction also participated in another central
bank’s operations. Due to uncertainties about the severity of the crisis,
banks became suddenly very risk averse. Accordingly, they were reluctant
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to lend funds on an unsecured basis and for terms longer than a few days.
As in other major currencies, the risk premium rose sharply in the Swiss
franc money market reﬂecting the higher perception of credit and liquidity
risk (see CGFS (2008)). This rendered it more diﬃcult for banks with a
reﬁnancing need to raise the necessary funds. We therefore also examine if
the banks’ bidding behavior changed in the crisis.
We ﬁnd that the factors aﬀecting reserves (e.g. yesterday’s bids and
a bank’s maturing repo operations) exhibit a strong inﬂuence on the deci-
sion to participate in the auction and on the bid amount. From the set of
interest rate factors the relative attractiveness of the SNB’s rate to the in-
terbank repo rate is the most relevant factor. Similar evidence was found by
Breitung/Nautz (2001), Nautz/Oechssler (2006) and Linzert et al. (2006)
suggesting that banks are more likely to participate or bid higher volumes in
the Eurosystem’s auction when central bank reserves are cheaper than in the
interbank market. The variable capturing the attractiveness of FX-swaps is
only of minor relevance. This ﬁnding suggests that banks do not primarily
use the SNB’s auction to fund Euros, by obtaining the Swiss francs via repo
transaction and subsequently swapping these Swiss francs into Euros via an
FX-swap. The fulﬁllment of minimum reserve requirements is irrelevant for
the bidding behavior of a large part of the banks under consideration. This
was also found by Linzert et al. (2006). Finally, we show that the banks’
bidding behavior did not systematically and materially change in the recent
money market turmoil. The reason for the unchanged behavior lies primarily
in the fact that the SNB conducted ﬁne-tuning operations to accommodate
the volatile demand for reserves. The ﬁne-tuning operations are usually con-
ducted in the overnight tenor, meaning they have an immediate eﬀect on a
bank’s reserves and hence on overnight rates. Because of these ﬁne-tuning
operations, bidding behavior in the 1-week auction was not substantially
aﬀected. Eisenschmidt et al. (2009) analyse banks bidding behaviour in the
ECB’s main reﬁnancing operations during the ﬁnancial turmoil in money
and ﬁnancial markets. They ﬁnd that increased bid rates during the tur-
moil can be explained, among other factors, by the increased attractiveness
of the ECB’s tender operations due to its collateral framework and banks
bidding more aggressively to avoid being rationed at the marginal rate in
times of increased liquidity uncertainty.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a short
overview of the SNB’s framework for the implementation of monetary policy.
Section 3 describes the banks’ determinants to participate and bid in the
auction. In the subsequent section the data is described. Section 5 presents
the bid functions and interprets the empirical ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Implementation of monetary policy at the SNB
This section provides a brief overview of the SNB’s implementation of mon-
etary policy. Since January 2000 the SNB announces a target range for
the Swiss franc 3-month Libor as operational target for the implementation
of monetary policy. The width of the target range is usually 1 percentage
point. The SNB communicates to the public the aimed level of the 3-month
Libor within the target range, which is usually the ”middle of the target
range”. Since a 3-month rate depends on expectations of shorter term
rates, the SNB allows ﬂuctuations of the Libor within the target range.
This tolerance of ﬂuctuations gives the SNB the leeway to react to other
variables – like the risk premium in money market or movements in the ex-
change rate – without altering its formal monetary policy stance (see also
Baltensperger et al. (2007)).
The management of the Swiss franc 3-month Libor is done through sev-
eral channels. Firstly, the announcement of the target range itself has an
inﬂuence on the Libor. Secondly, since the Libor depends on expectations,
the governing board manages the market expectation of future monetary
policy actions. This is mainly done by giving speeches and interviews. The
third element are the SNB’s open market operations, which we describe in
detail in section 2.1.
The level of reserves of domestic banks with the SNB is mainly deter-
mined by minimum reserve requirements: Banks have to hold a certain per-
centage of their short term liabilities and savings deposits in form of reserves
with the SNB and/or vault cash. The minimum reserve requirements have
to be fulﬁlled on average over the course of a maintenance period, which
runs from the 20th of every month to the 19th of the following month.
The Swiss National Bank Act states that one of the SNB’s tasks is to
supply the Swiss franc money market with reserves. In the sample period
the Swiss banking system is in a structural liquidity deﬁcit. A structural
liquidity deﬁcit is a situation where the banking system is short of reserves
versus the central bank, i.e. banks have to recur regularly to reﬁnancing
from the central bank. The structural liquidity deﬁcit is evident from the
position sight deposits of domestic banks and claims from repo transactions
in the SNB’s balance sheet. The claims from repo transactions (roughly 20
bn Swiss francs) on the asset side of the SNB’s balance sheet exceed the
banks’ sight deposits (roughly 5 bn Swiss francs) on the liabilities side. So
the banking system owes the central bank more than it claims. The reserves
to cover this deﬁcit are provided by the SNB to the banking system through
open market operations.
With respect to the implementation of monetary policy, there are basi-
cally two types of banks. The ﬁrst type exhibits excess reserves, meaning
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that it is a net lender of reserves to other banks. This type of banks mainly
consists of banks collecting deposits from non-banks without suﬃcient pos-
sibilities to invest the received funds. The second type exhibits a reserve
deﬁcit, meaning it is a net borrower of reserves. This type of banks can
cover its reﬁnancing need either in the interbank market or from the SNB.
Note that a bank can change its type once in a while. If a bank participates
in the SNB’s reserves providing operations, it is usually of type two.
2.1 Open Market Operations
There are two types of open market operations that the SNB employs to
supply the Swiss franc money market with reserves: Daily auctions usually
at 9.00 am and ﬁne-tuning operations. Auctions are conducted by way of
a ﬁxed rate tender (volume tender). In a ﬁxed rate tender auction, the
SNB announces the interest rate and term it oﬀers to its counterparties.
The targeted allotment in the auction is not communicated to the public.
Banks then have 10 minutes to tender their bids, without knowing the bids
of the other banks. After closing the auction, the SNB starts the allotment
process. If total bids exceed the SNB’s targeted allotment, each bank’s bid is
proportionally reduced. The interest rate, the allotment and the term oﬀered
depend on the SNB’s speciﬁc monetary policy intentions. In particular,
the SNB sets the term of the transactions in such a way that the banks
have to request reserves on an almost daily basis. The high frequency of
auctions facilitates liquidity management for the SNB and the participating
banks, and gives the SNB the opportunity to respond quickly to a change
in market conditions and to inﬂuence interest rates in the desired manner
(see SNB (2004)).
The aim of ﬁne-tuning operations is to counter undesired ﬂuctuations
in short term interest rates. These can be caused by a shift in the banks’
demand for reserves and by unexpected movements of reserves due to ﬂuc-
tuations in autonomous factors. The autonomous factors comprise the gov-
ernment’s balances with the SNB and currency in circulation, which are
both forecasted by the SNB when determining the target allotment. Fine-
tuning operations are conducted by placing quotes or (seldom) by accepting
the banks’ quotes in the repo interbank market. Fine-tuning operations are
conducted only intermittently.
A further type of regular open market operation is the issue of central
bank bills, so-called SNB Bills. SNB Bills were introduced in October 2008
to absorb reserves provided via EURCHF FX-swaps. The FX-swaps are a
coordinated measure of the SNB with the European Central Bank (ECB)
and the central banks of Poland and Hungary. Since the sample period in
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this paper ranges from January 2004 to September 2008 these instruments
are not covered in this paper.
2.2 Standing Facilities
In its standing facilities, the SNB sets the conditions under which banks can
obtain short-term reserves. The SNB has two sorts of standing facilities:
The liquidity-shortage ﬁnancing facility and the intraday liquidity facility.
The purpose of the liquidity-shortage ﬁnancing facility is to bridge short-
term liquidity bottlenecks. To draw from the liquidity-shortage ﬁnancing
facility, a bank needs a limit that deﬁnes the maximum amount of reserves
that can be drawn. This limit has to be covered with at least 110% collateral
eligible for SNB repos at all times. In the period of observation the interest
rate for this facility is set 200 basis points above the repo-overnight-index
(SNB) of the previous day.1 This penalty rate was chosen to deter banks
from regularly recurring to this facility and to increase the incentives for an
accurate liquidity management.
The aim of the intraday facility is to grease the payment system. To avoid
gridlocks and allow banks to cheaply settle their payment transactions early
in a value day, banks can draw funds from the intraday facility. This liquidity
has to be repaid by the end of the value day. Since intraday liquidity is a
public good and has no implications for monetary policy, it is provided to
banks on an interest rate free basis.
2.3 Counterparties
Eligible counterparties in the SNB’s open market operations are granted
access to all facilities. With regard to the eligibility of counterparties, the
SNB pursues an open access policy.2 This means, that the SNB does not
discriminate between original domiciles of banks or the legislation to which
they are subject. As a result, on average 40% of the SNB’s counterparties
are domiciled abroad and participate frequently in the auctions. Most other
central banks are more restrictive in this respect.3 The advantage of grant-
ing access to a broad range of counterparties is a more eﬀective distribution
1With eﬀect from 1 January 2009 the premium on the interest rate was reduced from
previously 200 basis points to 50 basis points.
2In general, a central bank can grant access to its facilities to four diﬀerent types
of bank groups: (i) Primary dealers which represent a selection of domestic banks or
securities broker-dealers; (ii) domestic banks; (iii) branches and subsidiaries which are
owned by banks domiciled abroad but regulated by the host country and (iv) banks
domiciled abroad. The SNB grants access to all types of bank groups.
3The Federal Reserve, for example, only grants access to open market operations to
a selected circle of banks (primary dealers), while all institutions that are subject to the
Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system have access to the ECB’s facilities. Hence, to
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of central bank reserves and hence a more direct monetary policy imple-
mentation. Unnecessary interdependencies in the distribution of reserves
and bypassing operations can be prevented. Furthermore, interbank mar-
ket strains – especially in times of market stress – can be addressed more
eﬀectively.
obtain the necessary reserves, a bank domiciled abroad has to establish a branch in the




This section identiﬁes the relevant factors for the banks’ bidding behavior in
the SNB’s 1-week auctions. The diversity of eligible counterparties implies
that banks have diﬀerent motives to participate in the auction. The decision
on participation and on the amount to tender will therefore depend on the
existence and magnitude of the various inﬂuencing factors for a bank. These
inﬂuencing factors can be categorized into factors aﬀecting reserves (liquidity
factors) and interest rate factors. These factors are subsequently outlined.
Liquidity factors
The ﬁrst factor is a bank’s bid in the auction of the previous working
day Bi,t−1. There are two antagonizing factors that yesterday’s bids exert.
On the one hand, there is a saturation eﬀect. Higher bids of a bank on
the previous day – and hence a higher individual allotment – reduce the
probability for a bank to recur to the SNB’s auction the day after, because its
demand for reserves in the next six days has been satisﬁed to a higher extent.
This would lead to a negative relationship between yesterday’s and today’s
bids. On the other hand, there is a reﬁnancing position eﬀect. A bank’s
decision to participate in the auction depends on its momentary (medium-
term) reﬁnancing need. If it has a reﬁnancing need, it will recur regularly
to the auction and refrain from participation if it has excess reserves. This
eﬀect would lead to a positive relationship between yesterday’s and today’s
bids.
The second factor is the amount of a bank’s maturing repo operations.
By incorporating the maturing operations (MOi,t) into the regression, we
capture a bank’s recurrence to the SNB’s ﬁnancing operations as it wants to
roll over its repos with the SNB to cover its short position. The maturing
operations are measured as the amount of a bank’s reserves – irrespective of
its original term – maturing on the value day of the speciﬁc 1-week auction.
The SNB provides on average 4 bn Swiss francs per working day to
its counterparties in ﬁve 1-week auctions per week, amounting to approxi-
mately 20 bn Swiss franc in outstanding repo operations. If the SNB pro-
vides longer-term repos, demand for 1-week repos from a bank which has
participated in the longer term operation should – ceteris paribus – decrease.
The 1-week and longer term repos are close substitutes for banks. A higher
amount of longer-term repos outstanding is expected to be negatively linked
with a banks’ decision to participate in the SNB’s auction as well as on the
amount to tender. In this paper, longer term repos are measured by a bank’s
outstanding volume from repo transactions with a term of more than one
week (LTi,t).
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Another inﬂuencing factor is a bank’s fulﬁllment of the minimum re-
serve requirements. Domestic banks and Swiss branches of banks domiciled
abroad have to fulﬁll minimum reserve requirements.4 In addition, branches
of foreign banks that may not necessarily need a bank license due to treaties
with other states have to meet these requirements.5 Hence, these banks
participate also in the SNB’s auctions to fulﬁll their minimum reserve re-
quirements. The degree of fulﬁllment of minimum reserve requirements is
approximated by the quota (MRi,t) of the current average of reserves in
the maintenance period and the average level of reserves at the end of the
respective period.6 A quota below (above) 100 stands for the fact that the
bank is momentarily holding less (more) reserves than it wants to hold on
average in the maintenance period. It should thus have a higher (lower)
incentive to participate in the auction and bid more (less) aggressively.
A further liquidity factor are the banknotes in circulation BNt. Ban-
knotes in circulation are a close substitute for reserves. If a bank needs
banknotes to ﬁll automated teller machines (ATM), it withdraws banknotes
from its reserve account with the central bank. An increase in banknotes in
circulation will lower reserves. Higher banknotes in circulation should thus
provide an incentive for banks to participate in the SNB’s auction and to
bid more aggressively.
The last liquidity factor are the government’s balances with the SNB.
The SNB provides banking services to the Swiss government.7 The govern-
ment’s balances (Gt) with the central bank inﬂuence the banks’ reserves.
If the government’s balances with the central bank increase – for example
because of tax payments – the level of reserves decreases. Less reserves in
the banking system is thus expected to be positively linked with the decision
to participate in the SNB’s auction as well as on the amount to tender.
Interest rate factors
The Swiss franc repo interbank market sets the same standards with
respect to eligible collateral, its handling and settlement as the SNB. As a
consequence this market and the prevalent rate ﬁgures as main inﬂuencing
interest rate factor. If the SNB’s repo rate is below the repo rate in the
interbank market, it is attractive for a bank to tender in the auction instead
of reﬁnancing itself in the interbank market. When the SNB’s repo rate is
4See National Bank Act arts. 17, 18 and 22-24, as well as the National Bank Ordinance
arts. 12-17 for more information on minimum reserve requirements.
5Art. 2 of the Banking Law.
6This approximation assumes that the SNB exactly provides the demanded reserves
(minimum reserve requirements plus excess liquidity) over the course of a maintenance
period. This assumption is plausible, since a provision of more (less) reserves would lead
to a undesired increase (decrease) in interest rates.
7Art. 5 para. 4 and art 11 of the National Bank Act.
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above the market rate, a bank may refrain from participating in the auc-
tion and borrow the money in the interbank repo market instead. In the
regression in section 5 the interest rate diﬀerence between the SNB’s repo
rate and the respective market interest rate, i.e. rrepo,t = rSNB,t − rIB,t, is
used as explanatory variable.
A majority of the SNB’s counterparties are active in several currencies.
A bank may have a reﬁnancing need in one currency and excess funds in
another currency. For a bank to participate in the auction it needs to have
a reﬁnancing need in at least one currency. On the one hand, banks with
a reﬁnancing need in Euros will recur to the SNB’s auction if the funding
of Euros via the SNB’s Swiss franc auction and the subsequent FX-swap
(Swiss franc against Euro) becomes relatively more attractive than a direct
funding in the Euro repo market. These banks will bid more in the SNB’s
auction if the FX-swap variable increases. On the other hand, banks with
an investment need in Euros – and a reﬁnancing need in Swiss francs – will
bid less if the rate obtained for Euros in the FX-swap is relatively more
attractive than investing the funds in the Euro repo market (and obtaining
the funds in the SNB’s auction). Figure 1 illustrates this reasoning. We
measure the relative attractiveness of the funding/investing via FX-swap
with the SNB’s rate, the Eurepo rate and the EURCHF-swap market rate.











I t t f EUR Investment of EUR
Funding of CHF
Funding of EUR
Figure 1: FX-swap: EUR funding vs. EUR investment/CHF funding
In times of market stress, uncertainty on reﬁnancing conditions on the
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unsecured markets increases. This is reﬂected in a higher spread between the
interest rates for unsecured and secured funds. Two motives link this spread
with bidding behavior. Firstly, higher uncertainty regarding the capability of
obtaining the funds on the unsecured interbank market should induce a bank
to participate in the SNB’s auction and to bid more aggressively. Secondly,
a bank may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to obtain funds in the SNB’s auctions and to
lend them in the unsecured interbank market at a higher rate. However,
a bank will only enter these trades if applied collateral costs and desired
compensation for risk are lower than the spread between the unsecured rate
and the SNB’s repo rate. The variable is calculated as diﬀerence between
the 1-week Libor and the SNB’s 1-week repo rate (runsec,t = l1W,t−rSNB,t).
This measure is often referred to as risk premium.
3.2 Relationship between bid amount and true demand
As mentioned in section 2.1, the SNB uses a ﬁxed rate tender auction to
provide reserves to the banking system. If the bids exceed the amount which
the SNB wants to allot, they are cut proportionally. The possibility of a
proportional cut may lead to strategic bidding behavior, which implies that
the bid amount is – unless the banks expect a full allotment – a multiple of
the amount that a bank actually wants to obtain, its true demand Dtrue,i,t
(see Ehrhart (2000)). The SNB, contrary to the ECB, has been spared by a
strategic bidding behavior leading to a steadily decreasing allotment ratio.8
This can be explained by the high frequency (daily) of auctions by the SNB,
the SNB’s adjustments of the allotment to demand and the same collateral
standard as the interbank market. Daily auctions reduce a bank’s risk of
a permanent shortfall of reﬁnancing, since a shortfall can be compensated
on the next day. The adjustment of the allotment to demand increases
the probability of obtaining too much reserves. This prevents a bank form
bidding excessively in the auction. Finally, the same collateral standard
as the interbank market allows a bank to easily ﬁnance a shortfall in the
market. A bank’s true demand depends on the factors described in section
3.1, so









8See Breitung/Nautz (2001) and Nautz/Oechssler (2006) for a review and discussion
on the overbidding phenomenon in the ECB System.
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This section provides a description of the data used in section 5. In principle,
the SNB can conduct repo auctions with terms of 1 day to several months.
There is no preannounced schedule for the SNB’s Swiss franc repo auctions.
However, the SNB almost invariably conducts repo auctions on a daily basis.
The importance of the 1-week term for the SNB’s open market operations
varied during the years. While from 2000 to 2003 1-week repo auctions were
used in 27% of the auctions, the SNB had used this term in approximately
90% of the cases since 2004. To analyze the banks’ bidding behavior we
will thus focus on the 1-week operations from January 2004 to September
2008. In the sample period 1,104 1-week auctions were conducted with an
average of 18 banks participating.9 Of these 18 banks, an average of 9 were
domiciled in Switzerland and 9 domiciled abroad.
As shown in ﬁgure 2 the total bids varied considerably. In the sample
period the average bid amount was 24.6 bn Swiss francs. On average the
SNB allotted roughly 4 bn Swiss francs. Table 1 provides a summary of the
SNB’s auctions for the pre-crisis period and the crisis. Total bids decreased
on average during the crisis. Since the true demand is given by the bids
multiplied by the expected allotment ratio (see section 3.2), the lower bids
during the crisis do not imply a lower demand for reserves. They are rather
an outcome of higher expected allotment ratios. The number of participating
banks did not materially change in the crisis.
A selection of liquidity variables is depicted in ﬁgure 3. The autonomous
factors (government balances at the SNB and banknotes in circulation) are
shown in aggregated form. Before the crisis, the SNB used longer term repo
operations only occasionally. In this period, the longer term operations were
generally not compensated by lower volumes in 1-week operations, i.e. the
operations were not substitutes. As a consequence, the total outstanding
repo volume rose when the SNB provided longer term repos. The increase
in outstanding repo volume was mainly used to compensate increases in
autonomous factors. In the crisis, on the contrary, longer term operations
seem to be a substitute for shorter term operations. The total outstanding
repo volume did not rise one-to-one with longer term repos: The main ob-
jective of using longer term repos instead of 1-week repos was to alleviate
banks’ liquidity position. Finally, the thick black line depicts the diﬀerence
between the outstanding repo volume and the autonomous factors. This is
a rough measure for the degree of the SNB’s reserve provision. It is evident,
that the provision of reserves was rather stable in the sample period.
Figure 4 shows a selection of interest rates used in the analysis. Since




Mean St.Dev. Max Min Mean St.Dev. Max Min
Total bids 28.2 20.1 178.6 0.9 20.0 17.0 114.0 0.6
Total allotment 4.0 1.2 8.9 0.9 4.3 1.4 8.0 0.6
Longer term OMOs 2.2 3.4 17.1 0.0 6.1 5.4 20.0 0.0
Minimum reserves 101.2 11.4 187.1 53.8 95.0 17.3 128.1 41.2
Banknotes 37.4 1.3 43.2 35.0 39.7 1.2 44.1 37.5
Government 2.5 2.1 9.8 0.2 5.7 5.5 15.2 1.0
Spread repo -0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.19 0.00 0.03 0.13 -0.11
Spread FX-swap -0.04 0.07 0.76 -0.27 -0.12 0.16 0.81 -0.80
Spread unsecured 0.10 0.04 0.32 -0.02 0.21 0.11 0.74 -0.01
Nr. of bidders 17.2 4.1 35.0 5.0 17.8 3.7 31.0 7.0
bn Swiss francs, percentage points, number
Table 1: Descriptive stats of the variables
the 1-week Libor is an unsecured rate it lies above the 1-week interbank repo
rate. The spread between the two rates varied only modestly prior to the
crisis. In the crisis, this spread widened sharply and the Libor’s volatility
rose. This is due to a higher risk premium and/or a rise in collateral cost.
The repo interbank rate and the SNB’s rate are roughly equal. The spread
amounts to 1 bp prior to the crisis and to 0 bp in the crisis. Nevertheless,
the ﬂuctuation of the interbank repo rate around the SNB’s rate is higher
in the crisis than before. The FX-swap variable (not depicted in the graph,
but shown in table 1) is more negative in the crisis. This implies that the
funding of Euros via Swiss franc repos with the SNB is more attractive than
directly in the Euro repo market or accordingly the investment of Euros to
obtain Swiss francs in a FX-swap less attractive than obtaining Swiss francs
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Figure 4: Interest rates
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5 Results
To shed light on the individual bank’s motives to participate in the auction,
we estimate a probit and tobit regression for 29 banks. These banks par-
ticipated in the SNB’s auctions both before and during the crisis. The 29
banks cover on average 77% of the number of banks participating and 89%
of total bids. To address the question if the bidding behavior changed in
the money market turmoil, we include the same set of regressors multiplied
by a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 in the crisis (August 2007 to
September 2008) and 0 before the crisis. The subsequent section investigates
the impact of the various inﬂuencing factors on the decision to participate
in the auction. Section 5.2 then examines banks’ bid amount.
5.1 Decision on participation
We ﬁrst examine the question which factors inﬂuence the banks’ decision
to participate in the auction on a given day. This question is analyzed by
using a probit model, where the dependent variable yi,t equals 1 if bank
i participates in the auction on day t = 1,...,T and 0 otherwise. The
regression results are shown in table 4. The 29 rows of the table correspond
to the 29 banks, the 10 columns to the regressors.10
For 23 banks yesterday’s own bid has a positive inﬂuence on the deci-
sion to participate in today’s auction. This ﬁnding shows that the liquidity
position eﬀect outweighs the saturation eﬀect. The highly signiﬁcant and
positive inﬂuence of the maturing repo operations for most banks is straight-
forward: A higher volume of maturing repo operations increases a bank’s
short position versus the SNB and consequently leads to a higher probability
of participation. In the sample period, the probability to participate in the
auction rose for eight banks if they had longer term repos outstanding with
the SNB. Before the crisis, the SNB often used longer term repo operations
to partially oﬀset a shortage of reserves in the banking system due to an
increase in the autonomous factors (banknotes and government’s balances
at the SNB). So, if a bank was strongly aﬀected by the increase in the au-
tonomous factors but did not fully cover its reﬁnancing needs in the longer
term auctions, it had to recur more often to the regular 1-week auctions.
For three banks the probability of participation decreases the more longer
term operations they have outstanding with the SNB. For these banks the
longer term operations are substitutes for 1-week transactions. They cover
their reﬁnancing need in the longer term operations and accordingly it is
less likely for them to take part in the 1-week auction. The majority of the
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the banknotes in circulation and the government’s
balances at the SNB have not the expected sign. As an individual bank’s
10For bank38 no probit regression was estimated as it participated in every auction.
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inﬂows and outﬂows resulting from banknotes and government balances are
not observed, we use aggregate data. This may be a possible reason for the
low explanatory power of the intuitively important variables. A further as-
pect is that both variables are not public information and diﬃcult to forecast
for a bank two days in advance.11 Provided that a bank holds less reserves
than required on average, it should have a higher incentive to participate in
the SNB’s auction. As in Linzert et al. (2006) this is not substantiated by
the data.
The inﬂuence of the interest rate factors (repo, FX-swaps and unsecured)
on the decision to participate is mixed. The repo variable seems to be
the most relevant determinant for participation. An increase in the spread
between the SNB’s rate and the interbank repo rate leads for 12 banks to
a signiﬁcantly higher probability that they will participate in the auction.
Further 11 banks have the expected negative (but insigniﬁcant) sign. For the
other two interest rate factors, slightly more than half of the coeﬃcients have
the expected sign but are often statistically not signiﬁcant. For the FX-swap
variable this is possibly due to the fact that a big majority of participating
banks have actually a reﬁnancing need in Swiss francs and not in Euro. The
two banks with the signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcients are maybe long in Euro
and short in Swiss franc: If the FX-swap variable rises, the implied interest
rate for the Swiss franc is lower and hence reﬁnancing from the SNB is less
attractive. The coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence between the 1-week Libor and
the SNB’s rate is statistically signiﬁcant and positive for four banks. The
probability for participation in the auction will rise if unsecured funding is
less attractive compared to the funding via repo operations.
For the whole sample we conclude that the liquidity variables exhibit
a strong inﬂuence on the decision to participate in the auction. Among
the set of interest rate factors the relative attractiveness of the SNB’s rate
compared to the interbank repo rate is the most decisive variable.
5.2 Bid amount
Based on aggregate data an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is run.
Results are shown in the top row of table 4. For the whole sample period, all
coeﬃcients on the inﬂuencing factors – except the one on unsecured funding
– have the expected sign. If the funding from the SNB is attractive compared
to the interbank market (repo, FX-swap), a bank will try to reﬁnance a
higher amount from the SNB. Numerically the spread of the SNB’s rate
compared to the interbank repo rate has the largest impact on the bids.
An increase in the diﬀerence between the two rates (iSNB,t − iIB,t) by one
11The 1-week contract is settled two working days after the auction date.
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basis point leads to a reduction in bids of 239 m Swiss francs. The spread
between the SNB’s rate and the rate for unsecured funding exhibits the
second largest (but insigniﬁcant) eﬀect (-130 m Swiss francs), although not
with the expected sign. The FX-swap variable has the smallest eﬀect among
interest rate factors (-3.3 m Swiss francs per basis point). These ﬁndings
can be interpreted as the repo interbank market being the most important
benchmark when deciding on the amount to tender in the SNB’s auction.
Although all liquidity variables have the expected sign, they only partly
exhibit a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the total bid amount: Solely the coeﬃcients
on yesterday’s bids and banknotes in circulation are signiﬁcant.
When running the regressions for the individual banks, we have to ac-
count for the nature of the dependent variable. If a bank participates in an
auction, we observe its bids. If a bank does not participate in an auction,
we observe a bid of zero Swiss francs. So, the bid amount is left censored
at zero. To account for the censored dependent variable we employ a tobit
model.
Table 4 shows the results of the tobit regressions for the individual banks.
The most striking results are the highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on yesterday’s
bids and a bank’s maturing repo transactions. While yesterday’s bids are
also signiﬁcant in the regression with aggregated bids, the maturing repo
operations are not. This could be because they average-out in the aggregate
– and are hence captured by the constant – but are an important inﬂuencing
factor when an individual bank determines its bids. Ten banks increase the
tendered amount in the 1-week auction if they have more longer term repos
outstanding with the SNB. For two banks the bid amount falls if they have
outstanding longer term operations with the SNB. Obviously, these banks
use the longer term funding as a substitute for the 1-week operations.
As we expected, the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the repo variable are all
negatively signed. Four banks have a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on
the FX-swap variable and only for one bank the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly
positive. The coeﬃcient for the unsecured funding is only signiﬁcant and
positive for one bank. For the majority of banks the coeﬃcients, albeit
insigniﬁcant, are negative. This result is counterintuitive since the partici-
pating banks usually rely on the secured and unsecured market to reﬁnance
assets. When the unsecured funding becomes less attractive, one would ex-
pect banks to shift their funding to the repo market. The costs of collateral
may provide a possible explanation for the negative coeﬃcients. As a rule of
thumb, the spread between the unsecured rate and the repo rate is roughly
equal to the costs of collateral. Accordingly, if the costs of collateral are
high (i.e. the unsecured-repo spread high), a bank can earn a fee by lending
the collateral in a securities lending transaction. Among the interest rate
factors, the attractiveness of the SNB’s rate compared to the repo market
1920
rate is the most important determinant of the bid amount. The FX-swap
variable and the unsecured variable are only of minor importance.
Akin to the ﬁndings in section 5.1, the liquidity factors play a predomi-
nant role in the decision on how much to bid in the SNB’s auction. Longer
term operations seem not to lower the bids in the 1-week auctions in the
whole sample. The spread between the SNB’s rate and the prevailing rate
in the interbank market is the most important interest rate factor. The FX-
swap variable and the unsecured funding are only of minor importance. This
ﬁnding suggests that banks do not primarily use the SNB’s auction to fund
Euros, by obtaining the Swiss francs via repo transaction and subsequently
swapping these funds into Euros via an FX-swap.
5.3 Change in bid functions in the crisis
Tables 3 and 5 report the changes in the bid functions in the crisis. The
inﬂuence of yesterday’s bids and the maturing repo transactions did not
materially change in the turmoil. For few banks the changes were signiﬁcant,
however, no common pattern is evident. For some banks the change in the
coeﬃcient on outstanding longer term operations was signiﬁcantly negative.
This can be taken as sign that banks prefer longer term reﬁnancing in order
to prolong the maturity of their liabilities in the crisis: They substitute 1-
week for longer term repos and therefore bid less in the 1-week auctions.
For the majority of banks, however, the sum of the two coeﬃcients (whole
sample plus changes in crisis) remain signiﬁcantly positive, suggesting that
for these banks the 1-week and longer term repos are still complements in the
crisis. The fulﬁllment of minimum reserve requirements remains irrelevant
for a large part of the banks under consideration.
For some banks the inﬂuence of the interest rate factors changed in the
probit regression. For four (one) banks the change in coeﬃcient for the repo
variable was signiﬁcantly negative (positive). A similar pattern is visible for
the funding via FX-swap. For ﬁve (four) banks the probability of participa-
tion increases (falls), when the funding of Euros gets more (less) attractive,
i.e. repo operations with the SNB and a subsequent foreign exchange swap is
cheaper (more expensive) than direct funding in the Euro repo market. The
unsecured funding variable is contrary to expectation. For ﬁve (one) banks
the change in coeﬃcients was signiﬁcantly negative (positive). In the crisis,
the funding on the unsecured market became more diﬃcult and the interest
rate diﬀerence between the unsecured and secured market increased. In this
setting, one would expect that this provides higher incentives to participate
in the SNB’s auction. Scarcity and/or cost of collateral may have induced
banks to refrain from participation in the auction. The tobit coeﬃcients
on the interest rate variables did also not materially change in the crisis.
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For four banks the coeﬃcient on the repo variable is more negative than
in the whole sample, meaning that the bid amount depends more on the
attractiveness of the SNB’s repo rate. Only for two banks the reaction to a
change in interest rates is less pronounced than before the crisis.
The coeﬃcients in tables 3 and 5 suggest that the banks’ bidding be-
havior did not systematically and materially change in the money market
turmoil. This result seems to be at odds with the common perception of
the SNB’s measures in the crisis. However, there are two reasons for this
discrepancy. Firstly, the sample period covers the period up to the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, i.e. the period where the crisis was relatively con-
tained. Because the SNB’s provision of reserves changed considerably after
September 2008, this period was not included: Since October 2008 the SNB
provides a large part of reserves through FX-swaps with the ECB, where the
counterparties are not known to us. Thus the he individual banks’ bidding
behavior cannot be examined and as a consequence the regressions cannot
be adjusted accordingly. Secondly, the 1-week auctions examined in this
paper are of only minor importance for the adjustment of the supply of re-
serves to a change in demand. In the crisis, the banks did in fact have a
volatile demand for reserves, which resulted in abrupt moves in short-term
interest rates. In order to stabilize short-term interest rates, the SNB em-
ployed ﬁne-tuning operations and thereby added or withdrew extra reserves.
Fine-tuning operations are usually conducted in the overnight tenor, mean-
ing they have an immediate eﬀect on banks’ reserves and hence on overnight
rates. In contrast, term contracts like the 1-week operations are settled two
working days after the auction, which renders them much less eﬀective to
address market strains. Because of these ﬁne-tuning operations, bidding
behavior in the 1-week auction was not substantially aﬀected by the crisis.
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6 Conclusion
To pursue its monetary policy, the SNB uses a target range for the Swiss
franc 3-month Libor as operational target. The SNB employs open mar-
ket operations to govern the 3-month Libor in the target range. Its main
instrument therefore are repo auctions. Among these repo auctions, the 1-
week tenor is by far the most frequently used term. This paper examines
the banks’ bidding behavior in the SNB’s 1-week repo auction before and
during the money market turmoil of 2007/2008.
There are several rationales for a bank to participate in the auction. We
divide the relevant determinants into liquidity and interest rate factors. Six
liquidity factors are identiﬁed. The ﬁrst are a bank’s own bids in the auction
of the previous day. This variable covers a bank’s current reﬁnancing need
(liquidity position eﬀect) as well as its accommodation with reserves for the
next week (saturation eﬀect). A further variable is a bank’s maturing repos
with the SNB. We expect this variable to exert a positive inﬂuence on the
bids since a bank may want to roll-over the maturing repos. The volume of a
bank’s outstanding longer term repo operations with the SNB has a positive
inﬂuence on bids if the SNB uses the longer term repos to partially compen-
sate for a temporary change in autonomous factors (government balances
with the SNB and banknotes in circulation). A negative eﬀect is expected
if a bank uses the longer term repos as a substitute for shorter term oper-
ations. If a bank’s current average of reserves in the maintenance period is
below the desired level, we expect it to have a higher incentive to participate
in the auction and to bid more aggressively. The ﬁnal liquidity factors are
the autonomous factors. Since a rise in autonomous factors absorbs reserves
from the banking system, we expect them to have a positive inﬂuence on a
bank’s decision to participate and on the bid amount.
The set of interest rate factors includes rates from the repo interbank
market, the unsecured money market and the FX-swap market. We use the
spread between the SNB’s rate and the repo interbank rate as a measure of
attractiveness of the SNB’s rate and expect the probability of participation
and the amount of bids to rise if the SNB’s rate becomes more attractive
relative to the market rate. Since a bank can alternatively reﬁnance its
assets in the unsecured market instead of recurring to the SNB’s auction,
we also include the spread between the 1-week Libor and the SNB’s repo
rate in the regression. If the spread between the 1-week Libor and the SNB’s
1-week rate rises, we expect the bids to be higher. The last interest rate
factor refers to the FX-swap. A counterparty may have a reﬁnancing need
in Euro. If it is relatively cheap to fund Euros via a repo transaction with
the SNB (thereby getting Swiss francs) and to subsequently swap the Swiss
francs into Euros, a bank will bid more in the auction. If a bank has excess
Euros but a reﬁnancing need in Swiss francs, it will bid less.
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For the whole sample we can conclude that among the liquidity variables
yesterday’s own bids and the maturing repo operations exhibit the strongest
inﬂuence on the decision to participate in the auction and on the amount
to bid. The two autonomous factors are of only minor importance. From
the set of interest rate factors, the relative attractiveness of the SNB’s rate
compared to the interbank repo rate is the most important variable. The
unsecured rate and the funding of Euros via FX-swaps are only signiﬁcant
for few banks.
The results presented in section 5 suggest that the banks’ bidding be-
havior did not systematically and materially change in the money market
turmoil of 2007/2008. This ﬁnding seems to be counterintuitive at ﬁrst.
However, there are two reasons for this discrepancy. Firstly, the sample
period only covers the period up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, i.e.
the period where the crisis was relatively contained. Secondly, the 1-week
auctions examined in this paper are of only minor importance for the ad-
justment of the supply of reserves to a change in demand. In the crisis,
the banks did in fact have a volatile demand for reserves, which resulted in
abrupt moves in short-term interest rates. In order to stabilize short-term
interest rates, the SNB employed ﬁne-tuning operations and thereby added
or withdrew extra reserves. Fine-tuning operations are largely conducted
in the overnight tenor, meaning they have an immediate eﬀect on banks’
reserves and hence on overnight rates. In contrast, term contracts like the
1-week operations are settled two working days after the deal, which ren-
ders them much less eﬀective to address market strains. Because of these
ﬁne-tuning operations, bidding behavior in the 1-week auction was not sub-
stantially aﬀected.
The results of this paper suggest that the SNB’s auction procedure to
provide reserves to the banking system has proven useful before and during
the crisis. Deviations of the interbank rate from the SNB’s rate have a high
impact on the bid amount. This, in turn, blurs the identiﬁcation of the
bank’s true demand for reserves. In order to decrease the volatility of the
bid amount the SNB should aim to close the spread, by providing reserves
such that the interbank rate lies as near as possible to the SNB’s rate. In the
period of observation the spread between the two interest rates was close to
zero (see table 1). This suggest that the ﬁxed rate tender with proportional
cut is a suitable tool for the management of interest rates. Alternatively,
the SNB could conduct a ﬁxed rate tender with full allotment. However, we
suspect a ﬁxed rate tender with full allotment to result in a over provision
of reserves and hence a market interest rate below the SNB’s rate. This is
partly because banks do not have the same set of information as the central
bank. Furthermore, part of the bids are not due to a reﬁnancing need in
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